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Introduction
Most explanations of the current economic and financial crisis focus on 
its financial causes. Often missing in these explanations is a discussion 
of how the seeds of the crisis were sown by economic policies in major 
countries that fostered the growth of global imbalances during the 2000s. 
Moreover,  just  as  these  imbalances  created  the  current  crisis,  exactly 
how they are likely to unwind—or fail to be resolved—over the period 
immediately ahead will play a major role in determining the prospects for 
world economic recovery and the pace of future growth.
Largely reflecting economic policies, substantial imbalances in savings and 
investment emerged among major world economies after 2000, and these 
imbalances were reflected in growing current account imbalances. Rising 
U.S. deficits and increasing surpluses in emerging East Asian economies 
(especially China) and oil-exporting countries in the Middle East developed. 
The underlying savings and investment imbalances gave rise to a “savings 
glut” in developing countries and spawned sizable net capital flows to the 
advanced countries, with the United States being the primary recipient. 
This glut of savings contributed to a substantial reduction in world interest 
rates.1 At the same time, a significant rise in demand for official reserve 
assets  (largely  in  the  form  of  U.S.  Treasury  and  Agency  securities), 
especially  by  East  Asian  and  Middle  Eastern  economies,    crowded  out 
private  demand  for  such  high-quality,  low-risk  assets.  Consequently,  a 
scramble by private investors to try to find other higher yielding but low-
risk assets contributed to the financial excesses that finally culminated 
in the turmoil that gripped world financial markets in late 2008 and early 
2009.
Since the onset of the crisis, current account imbalances among the major 
economies have declined. But to a large extent this development reflects 
the effects of the economic downturn. Economic policy changes are needed 
to address the underlying imbalances in savings and investment behavior 
that continue to exist. The policy actions needed are well known and have 
been widely discussed for a number of years now.2  Discussion of such 
measures  currently  and  consideration  of  implementing  them  generally 
have been put on hold. Instead, policies have been focused on dealing 
with the economic downturn and the regulatory failures that played a 
1  Ben S. Bernanke, “The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit,” Homer 
Jones  Lecture,  April  14,  2005,  and  “Global  Imbalances:  Recent  Developments  and 
Prospects,” Bundesbank Lecture, September 11, 2007. 
2   The International Monetary Fund has written at length about the problem of global 
imbalances since the early 2000s. See World Economic Outlook, International Monetary 
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major role in the financial aspects of the current crisis. However, active 
consideration of these measures needs to be revived. A critical challenge 
for policymakers in formulating policies that both cushion the economic 
downturn  and  promote  economic  recovery,  is  also  to  look  to  adopting 
policies that will address global imbalances at a reasonable pace. These 
are not conflicting objectives and only by doing so will it be possible to 
achieve more robust and stable growth in the world’s major economies 
over the medium term.
At  this  juncture,  the  situation  overall  is  not  encouraging.  While  some 
policies being pursued will facilitate the adjustment of global imbalances, 
actions in many countries appear likely to add to imbalances over time, 
and the lack of needed policy actions—especially structural reforms—in 
other countries will delay adjustment as well. Consequently, the outlook 
for recovery and growth in the world economy does not look good. With 
adjustment in imbalances occurring in the United States that will result 
in significantly slower growth in demand, the key challenge for the world 
economy will be to find other sources of demand to take the place of 
the U.S. However, this appears likely to be a daunting task. None of the 
other major economies appear inclined to make the necessary changes 
in policies to deal with their imbalances and raise their demand. In these 
circumstances, the world is likely to face a prolonged period of slower 
growth and greater instability than it has known for several decades.
For a small, open economy like New Zealand, this situation will pose a very 
inhospitable environment. While there is little that New Zealand can do 
to change things, the key to making the best of a bad situation will be to 
retain the economy’s flexibility and adaptability. NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy 6 
The Rise of Global Imbalances
Economic policies in major countries were the primary factor behind the 
rise  of  global  imbalances  during  the  2000s.  Policy-induced  distortions 
gave rise to substantial imbalances in savings and investment that were 
reflected in large current account imbalances. However, the current account 
imbalances themselves were not per se evidence of global imbalances. It 
was the effects of policies that drove the savings and investment patterns 
that created the problem of global imbalances. The large current account 
deficits and surpluses that emerged just reflected the underlying economic 
situation.
It was differences in the underlying economic situation that marked the 
very sharp contrast between the current account imbalances of the 1990s 
and those of the 2000s, especially in the case of the United States. The 
rise in the U.S. current account deficit during the 1990s was not indicative 
of major policy misalignments (Figure 1). 
U.S. national saving actually rose, as policy actions led to consolidation 
of  the  fiscal  position.  Investment,  reflecting  the  boom  prompted  by 
rising productivity in the wake of the information technology changes, 
rose sharply relative to the increase in savings, and it was the rise in 
investment that drove the increase in the U.S. current account deficit. 
Inflows of capital funded the investment boom in the United States and 
led to a sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar, which served to push up the 
current account deficit.
Figure 1. United States: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Deficit
Source: Treasury (2008a) Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2009 
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Imbalances Among the Major Economies in the 
2000s
The U.S. current account deficit rose further during the 2000s. Business 
fixed investment slowed over much of this period and did not return to 
its levels relative to GDP achieved in the second half of the 1990s. But 
this decline was more than offset by a drop in national savings relative to 
GDP. This drop reflected in part a dramatic shift to an expansionary fiscal 
policy. It also reflected a decline in household savings, as low interest 
rates and increased availability of financing related to housing sparked a 
boom in consumption. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the 1990s, the value 
of the U.S. dollar declined after 2001, at times facing strong downward 
pressure.
Consumption-fueled  growth  in  the  United  States  fostered  economic 
expansions in Japan and Europe on the back of higher exports. Corporate 
savings rose as profits increased. However, problems in the structures 
of  these  countries’  economies—especially  rigidities  in  product  and 
labor  markets—limited  opportunities  for  domestic  investment.  Private 
consumption  growth  remained  sluggish,  reflecting  uncertainties  about 
employment prospects and slow wage growth. The combination of high 
savings and sluggish investment led to rising national savings and external 
surpluses (Figures 2 and 3). 
Figure 2. Euro Area: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Balance
Figure 3. Japan: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Surplus
Source: Treasury (2008a) Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2009.
Figure 2. Euro Area: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Balance
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Savings  and  investment  imbalances  and  current  account  surpluses  of 
developing countries also rose sharply. In particular, the years after 2000 
witnessed a dramatic rise in the savings and investment imbalance in 
China. Despite very strong investment, Chinese savings posted an even 
larger rise. The fiscal position (government savings) improved significantly, 
but it was the rise in corporate savings that explained most of the increase 
in China’s national savings (Figure 4).
In emerging economies in East Asia other than China3, investment relative 
to GDP declined in the years after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 
(Figure 5). Investment in structures fell sharply following the excesses 
that occurred in the buildup to the Asian financial crisis. External surpluses 
also reflected policy decisions in many of these countries to rebuild official 
reserves, which had been decimated during the crisis. These surpluses 
also reflected concerns regarding competitive pressures on these countries 
posed  by  China.  Accordingly  these  countries  engaged  in  substantial 
sterilized  intervention.  However,  concerns  about  rising  inflationary 
pressures after 2006 led many of them to increase the flexibility of their 
exchange rates.
After 2002, current account surpluses of Middle East oil-exporting countries 
began to rise substantially (Figure 6). Initially, concerns about the security 
of oil supplies drove up prices, in the wake of the war in Iraq. But price 
pressures  also  increased  as  global  demand  for  oil  rose  sharply  with  a 
significant rise in demand from countries in East Asia and India. 
The substantial savings by East Asian emerging economies and Middle 
East oil-exporting countries gave rise to large net capital outflows. Most 
of these flows found their way to the United States. With the desired level 
of savings in the world exceeding desired investment at the interest rates 
prevailing at the time, the glut of global savings drove down real rates of 
interest and contributed to a boom in asset prices.
Over time, the cycle began to feed on itself. With expanded availability of 
credit and lower interest rates, U.S. households used debt to fuel a housing 
boom, and they used rising housing wealth to finance sustained growth 
in consumption. In turn, rising U.S. demand stimulated additional growth 
in the rest of the world, adding to current account surpluses, especially in 
East Asian emerging-market economies. Among these countries, China’s 
current account surplus skyrocketed and official reserves rose to record 
levels. Competitive pressures from China also created pressure on other 
East Asian countries to limit the appreciation of their currencies against 
the U.S. dollar. The current account surpluses of oil-exporting countries in 
the Middle East also rose. As the developing countries’ external surpluses 
were funneled back to the United States through net capital flows, this 
financing  helped  fund  a  continuation  of  the  consumption  and  housing 
boom and a steady rise in asset prices and ultimately led to the financial 
crisis that began in August 2008.
Blame for the financial excesses that occurred and the ensuing crisis is often 
attributed to the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed). It is asserted that the 
Fed permitted loose monetary conditions to prevail for too long. Financial 
3   This group includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Korea is included in the group for convenience, although 
it is now classified as an advanced economy.9  NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy
Figure 5. Emerging East Asia: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Surplus
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2009
Figure 4. China: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Surplus
Figure 6. Middle East: Savings, Investment, and Current Account Surplus
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difficulties could have been reduced or precluded if the Fed had tightened 
policy earlier. This argument in effect suggests that the Fed alone should 
have tried to offset the impact of global imbalances. It fails to recognize 
the difficulty of such a task. With the inflows of capital to the United States 
arising  from  the  imbalances,  the  yield  curve  in  the  United  States  was 
relatively flat through much of the 2000s, suggesting that a decision by 
the Fed to hike short-term policy rates might not have fully passed through 
into long-term rates. Indeed, senior Fed officials had commented on the 
unusual difficulties being encountered in trying to use monetary policy to 
influence long-term interest rates. Former chairman Alan Greenspan often 
spoke of an “interest rate conundrum,”4 and then deputy chairman Ben 
Bernanke offered the “savings glut” as an explanation for the low level of 
long-term interest rates. 
The flat yield curve did not indicate that the Fed could not bring about 
an increase in long-term interest rates. Monetary policy could have been 
tightened, but a substantial policy tightening would have been required. 
Such aggressive use of monetary policy would have inflicted a very high 
cost on the U.S. economy and in turn the rest of the world. While the costs 
inflicted by the current economic and financial crisis are quite high, the 
relevant question is whether other policy alternatives would have been 
better placed than monetary policy in order to deal with the situation 
at a much lower cost. Obviously, dealing more aggressively with global 
imbalances would have been the most appropriate policy response.
Failures  in  regulation  and  supervision  played  a  particularly  important 
part in feeding the excesses that developed in the markets for asset-
backed  securities  that  eventually  triggered  the  financial  turmoil  after 
August  2008.  There  were  indications  that  problems  were  emerging, 
but regulatory authorities did not take significant actions. In part, this 
reflected the fragmented regulatory system in the United States where 
a  number  of  different  entities  each  have  responsibility  for  specific 
segments of the financial market.5 Laxness in regulation also played a 
role. Such laxness was partly by design reflecting the political philosophy 
of the U.S. Administration and a desire to encourage innovation in the 
financial markets. As well, it may have reflected difficulties on the part of 
the regulators in keeping up with the financial market innovations taking 
place. However, a major factor appears to have been a failure on the 
part of banking regulators to fully comprehend the risks that the banking 
system was taking on. In the end, even if the regulatory and supervisory 
problem could have been avoided, this would only have dampened the 
magnitude of the crisis, but it could not have prevented it.
Features of the International Financial System 
Facilitated Global Imbalances
Normally,  a  current  account  imbalance  would  be  expected  to  trigger 
forces that would promote adjustment and maintain the imbalance at a 
4   See “Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan,” The Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual 
Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, delivered before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 16, 2005.
5   In Europe, fragmentation of regulatory authority may also have played a role. Within 
the euro area, each country continues to maintain its own regulatory regime, and these 
regimes vary widely.11  NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy
sustainable level. Countries with deficits usually face increasing difficulties 
in  obtaining  financing.  Adjustment  then  takes  place  through  upward 
pressure  on  domestic  interest  rates,  downward  pressure  on  the  real 
exchange rate, and slowing domestic economic activity. Surplus countries 
face pressures in the opposite direction, with rising economic activity and 
appreciation of the real exchange rate being the main forces that prompt 
balance-of-payments  adjustment.  That  global  imbalances  were  able  to 
grow and persist for an extended period of time points to features in the 
international financial system that have worked to delay adjustment. 
One  such  feature  is  the  role  played  by  countries  that  provide  official 
reserve  assets.  This  is  an  important  feature  that  gives  needed  scope 
for reserve assets in the system to expand as the world economy and 
international trade grow. But it can also enable a country that provides 
reserve assets to delay adjustment in its external position because the 
country can finance a deficit rather easily for some time by issuing assets 
in its domestic currency.
To a significant extent, flows of capital to the United States reflected a 
strong preference for U.S. dollar assets owing to the pivotal role the dollar 
plays as a reserve currency. Consequently, the United States was able to 
finance its external deficits and delay needed adjustments in domestic 
savings. But the dollar’s role as the principal reserve currency was not the 
sole reason for the ease in financing its external deficit that the United 
States experienced during the 2000s. There were also sizable net flows 
of private capital into the United States because of a perception that U.S. 
markets were better regulated, had better governance, and were more 
secure than markets in emerging economies. Moreover, in the first part of 
the 2000s, economic growth was faster in the United States and returns 
on financial assets were perceived as being higher than in other advanced 
countries. As a result, a self-reinforcing effect set in. As capital inflows 
to the United States boosted asset prices and returns, additional flows of 
capital were stimulated.
A second feature of the international system that contributed to the growth 
in imbalances is that countries with balance of payments surpluses that 
manage their exchange rates can resist upward pressure on their currencies 
for extended periods. Deficit countries facing downward pressure on their 
exchange rates can defend the rate and finance their deficits only as long 
as they have official reserves or are willing to use their reserve assets.6 
But countries facing upward pressure on their rates have no such reserve 
constraint, given that the rest of the world is demanding their currencies. 
They can hold their exchange rates by intervening in the market and selling 
their own currencies. To offset effects on domestic monetary conditions 
and forestall a rise in inflation that would induce a real appreciation of 
their currencies, these countries can attempt to “sterilize” their exchange 
market interventions through domestic monetary policy actions. 
There are limits, however, to how long sterilized intervention will work. 
In particular, the cost of such intervention in terms of higher domestic 
interest rates will eventually take its toll on the finances of the central 
bank and have consequences for the real economy, but these adverse 
6   Using foreign exchange controls can extend the period, but the resulting impact on 
the real economy can be rather harsh and such actions directed at current account 
transactions can invite retaliation by other countries.NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy 12 
effects may go unnoticed for quite some time. To diminish some of these 
serious consequences, sterilized intervention can be supported by capital 
controls and administrative controls over domestic financial markets (e.g., 
moral suasion or window guidance to control credit growth).7 Although the 
effectiveness of capital and administrative controls will diminish over time, 
such measures can succeed for a while.8 
Imposing capital and administrative controls is not without cost because 
of the distortions they create and the repression of the financial system 
that  tends  to  occur.  Moreover,  like  any  price  distortion,  maintaining 
an  undervalued  exchange  rate  will  impose  large  costs  on  the  real 
economy.  The  distortion  in  the  value  of  the  exchange  rate  will  create 
serious misallocations of resources in the export- and import-substituting 
sectors of the economy. The longer an undervaluation of the currency 
is  maintained,  the  greater  the  misallocations  created  and  the  more 
difficult the readjustment the economy must undergo to unwind these 
misallocations.
Among the emerging economies in East Asia, China is the one that most 
exploited this flaw in the international financial system during the 2000s. To 
maintain an increasingly undervalued exchange rate, China had to amass 
a stunning amount of official reserves; with nearly $1.6 trillion of these 
reserves (roughly ¾ of China’s total reserve holdings) being accumulated 
in the period after the country’s exchange rate regime was changed in 
July 2005. 
Another  feature  of  the  international  financial  system  that  worked 
to  encourage  delay  in  external  adjustment  arises  as  an  inadvertent 
consequence  of  floating  exchange  rates.  A  depreciating  currency  can 
provide a “sheltering effect” for the traded goods sector of a country’s 
economy, and thus slow adjustment to adverse economic shocks arising 
from structural changes.9 Specifically, currency depreciation can reduce 
pressure on a country’s external position, providing an opportunity to more 
gradually make policy changes—especially reforms in the structure of a 
country’s economy—that may be needed to deal with the consequences 
of a shock. Because currency depreciation initially has a positive effect on 
economic growth, the tendency is to overlook the longer-term negative 
consequences. Moreover, slower initial adjustment can also contribute to 
depreciation pressures on a country’s exchange rate that can persist for 
some time, providing additional incentive for adjustment delay. 
Liberalization  of  trade  during  the  1990s  and  the  rise  of  the  newly 
industrializing  countries,  particularly  China,  was  a  major  competitive 
shock to advanced economies. This shock had particularly strong effects 
on European economies, with their rigid product and labor markets. Japan 
was  also  affected  for  similar  reasons.  Depreciation  in  their  currencies 
during the late 1990s took some of the pressure off both Europe and 
7   The so-called iron trinity argument suggests that by instituting capital controls, a country 
trying to peg its exchange rate is able to pursue an independent monetary policy.
8   Capital controls can be looked at as being equivalent to a tax on international capital 
movements. When potential returns are high enough, investors will be willing to incur 
additional costs to evade the controls, and the higher the potential return, the greater 
the incentive for investors to evade.
9   See, for example, Richard G. Harris, The New Economy and the Exchange Rate Regime, 
Center for International Economic Studies, Adelaide University, March 2001.13  NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy
Japan to implement structural reforms. In Europe, labor market reforms 
were badly needed but politically difficult to implement. Some reforms 
were enacted, but these reforms were partial and incomplete. Moreover, 
by delaying reform, European countries set themselves up for a sharp 
slowdown in growth when the euro began to appreciate in the 2000s. The 
impact of that appreciation was initially blunted by strong demand from 
the Middle East and China that boosted exports of the major European 
economies, principally Germany and France, but this demand evaporated 
during the current economic and financial crisis.
Other Reasons for Delayed Adjustment
Adjustment in policies was also delayed by an emerging belief that the 
problem of global imbalances would diminish over time as growth outside 
of the United States—particularly in Europe and East Asia—was seen to 
be decoupling from U.S. growth. In addition, it was argued that other 
countries—especially  China—were  stepping  up  to  become  engines  to 
sustain world growth. The problem of global imbalances was increasingly 
thought to be potentially self-correcting. Accordingly, it was believed that 
there was time for more gradual changes in economic policies in the major 
countries.10 
The  decoupling  and  new  engines  of  growth  myths  stemmed  from  a 
simplistic analysis of national accounts data. The data for Europe and East 
Asian countries indicated that domestic demand, not net exports, was 
increasingly the major contributor to economic growth, hence the view 
that growth in these economies had decoupled from growth elsewhere. 
The new engines myth was derived from an analysis of world GDP data, 
which showed that other countries’ contributions to world GDP growth 
were  rising  relative  to  the  contribution  of  the  United  States.  Indeed, 
China’s contribution to world growth exceeded that of the United States 
in 2007. 
The basic problem with the analysis underlying the decoupling myth was 
that it focused solely on the proximate sources of growth. No attempt 
was made to try to determine whether domestic demand growth was self-
sustaining or whether it was generated as the knock-on (or multiplier) 
effect  arising  from  the  income  derived  from  exports.  Similarly,  in  the 
new engines of growth myth, the suggestion that China was becoming 
a growth engine for the world economy did not factor in whether China 
was actually generating demand for the rest of the world. China certainly 
was, to some extent, doing so for the rest of Asia. However, the engine 
10   In the report on the multilateral consultation with major members held by the IMF 
in late 2006 and early 2007, the view of the participating countries was: “The [global] 
imbalances were seen as a fundamentally medium-term problem that required medium-
term solutions. There was general agreement that a correction in global imbalances would 
eventually be necessary, but with the U.S. current account deficit still being relatively 
easily financed, most saw the immediate risks as low; the greatest concern was that 
imbalances could add to protectionist pressures, on both the current and capital account. 
Thus the policy strategy should be gradualist in nature, consistent with and supportive 
of the necessary adjustment in the private sector, and aiming to build confidence that a 
credible and consistent strategy to reduce imbalances was being pursued.” “Staff Report 
on the Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances with China, the Euro Area, Japan, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United States,” International Monetary Fund, June 2007.NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy 14 
ultimately driving China’s import demand was China’s exports.11 
That the recession in the United States has had a more severe than expected 
impact on the rest of the world has exposed these propositions as myths 
and dashed hopes that a permanent correction in global imbalances could 
be achieved without a severe disruption to world growth. The financial 
turmoil may have added to the slowdown in the rest of the world, but it 
is the loss of stimulus derived from U.S. demand that has been the major 
factor in slowing economic growth worldwide. Now there is a clear need 
for policy actions to deal with the problem, and global imbalances should 
no longer be considered a medium-term problem that can be dealt with 
gradually. 
Prospects for the World Economy
Understandably, the policy focus up until now has been on tackling the 
immediate problems of dealing with major financial disruptions, stabilizing 
the world’s major economies, and trying to restart growth. Any thinking 
beyond these initial challenges has been directed at addressing financial 
sector  regulatory  and  supervisory  failures.  Increasingly,  light  is  being 
seen at the end of the tunnel, and the beginnings of economic recovery 
are being proclaimed. Exit strategies from economic stimulus measures 
are being discussed. But, although it is recognized that economic growth 
going forward may be relatively slow, little attention is being given to finally 
coming  to  grips  with  the  fundamental  problems  in  the  real  economies 
of the major countries that gave rise to global imbalances and sowed 
the seeds for the crisis. Resolving these problems are key to achieving a 
robust, sustained expansion of growth in the major economies. The world 
economy emerging from the current crisis will be very different from the 
one that existed before. The major difference is that some adjustment in 
global imbalances is likely to take place; however, this adjustment will be 
uneven and the unevenness will tend to slow world growth. In particular, 
imbalances in the United States will adjust and U.S. growth will slow. But 
it is not clear which of the other major economies will step up to pick up 
the slack in demand. 
Adjustment in the United States
At this point, only in the United States does it appear that adjustment in 
global imbalances is taking place. In particular, savings in the household 
sector  have  risen  significantly,  and  these  increases  are  likely  to  be 
permanent.  The  decline  in  housing  prices  has  had  a  major  impact  on 
savings behavior. The surge in consumption during the economic expansion 
in the early 2000s was heavily linked to increases in the value of housing. 
However, this consumption boom did not reflect a traditional wealth effect; 
it was predominantly a financing phenomenon. Innovations in financial 
markets  increased  access  to  credit  for  households  by  making  it  very 
easy for individuals to tap the equity in their homes to fund consumption 
expenditures. But this source of financing for consumption has dried up. 
11   In fact, the slowing in China’s export growth in late 2008 and 2009 has been accompanied 
by a substantial slowdown in the growth of China’s imports. 15  NZIER viewpoint | Global imbalances and prospects for the world economy
With lower house prices, households have less equity in their homes and 
with a greater debt burden acquired in the previous expansion, households 
are more reluctant to borrow. Consequently, savings   (Figure 7) is rising, 
and in recent quarters, it has returned to its previous trend value. During 
the last economic expansion in the 1990s, household savings averaged 
about 5-6 percent of disposable personal income, compared with the near 
zero rate recorder during the final years of the economic expansion in the 
2000s. 
There are reasons to believe that the U.S. household savings rate will 
rise significantly above its current level. Households have experienced a 
substantial decline in financial wealth, as well as a sharp fall in the value of 
housing. Savings will have to rise as individuals seek to rebuild their wealth. 
This is particularly the case for members of the baby boom generation 
because they are fast approaching the traditional age for retirement. They 
now have no choice but to significantly raise their savings or postpone 
retirement.  In  the  early  1990s,  the  baby  boomers  faced  a  somewhat 
similar need to increase financial resources for retirement. At that time, 
they had two basic choices: to save more or to raise the returns on their 
existing savings. They chose to raise returns on their assets by shifting 
their  portfolios  toward  higher  yielding  equity  investments.  Households 
have  already  diversified  their  portfolios  heavily  into  equities,  and  they 
have little room to shift them further and little appetite to do so. Twice 
in the past decade major stock market corrections have hit household 
financial wealth hard, making equity investments look a lot more risky 
than they were perceived to be originally. In these circumstances, the 
baby boomers are likely to choose to raise their savings significantly. 
The U.S. government will also have to increase its savings to deal with the 
massive fiscal deficit that has opened up, in part owing to the necessary 
measures  that  the  current  Administration  has  taken  to  stabilize  the 
economy. But government savings will also have to rise to deal with the 
underlying  imbalance  in  the  U.S.  fiscal  position  that  has  existed  since 
the previous Administration embarked on a substantial fiscal expansion 
in the early 2000s. In order for the U.S. government to be able to meet 
its obligations to its aging population without having to resort to major 
increases in taxes or cuts in spending (including programs for the elderly), 
Figure 7. United States: Household Savings Rate 
Percent of GDP
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the budget will have to be brought back into surplus and that surplus will 
have to be maintained for some time to cope with the pressures associated 
with the aging of the population over the medium term. 
The  Administration  has  recognized  the  need  for  fiscal  consolidation. 
Its budget blueprint released in early 2009 lays out a credible plan for 
beginning  this  process.  However,  in  implementing  a  substantial  fiscal 
consolidation on the scale of what is needed, the Administration will face 
some tough choices, especially in an economic and political environment 
that may not appear readily conducive to fiscal consolidation. Relatively 
slow economic growth over the next several years will offer a convenient 
pretext for putting off adjustment. But the Administration will have to 
proceed anyway or risk creating conditions that will result in persistent 
slow growth. 
Somewhat slower growth in the near term arising from moving ahead with 
fiscal consolidation is a necessary tradeoff to achieve sustainable budget 
finances over the medium term. Delaying fiscal adjustment would provide 
only a marginally higher rate of growth for a short period of time at the 
expense of a more protracted period of slow growth. Near term growth 
would tend to be only marginally higher because household savings are 
likely to rise even further as households recognize that either medium-
term government promises regarding pension and health care benefits 
would  be  broken  or  that  taxes  would  have  to  be  substantially  higher 
or  other  government  spending  cut.  A  protracted  period  of  large  fiscal 
deficits would also significantly push up real interest rates and reduce 
investment, reducing growth. So in the end, the Administration has only 
one responsible choice and that is to proceed with fiscal consolidation as 
economic recovery takes hold in the next one to two years.
Therefore, it can be expected that national savings in the United States 
will rise substantially in the period ahead. Thus, adjustment in the U.S. 
savings and investment imbalance will take place and the current account 
deficit  will  narrow.    Consequently,  demand  in  the  United  States  over 
the next decade or so will grow substantially slower than it has in the 
preceding three decades.
Picking Up the Slack: Europe and Japan? 
Europe is an unlikely candidate to pick up the slack in world demand 
resulting from slower U.S. growth. Major European countries—particularly 
Germany—look  likely  to  remain  heavily  dependent  on  exports  to  drive 
their economies. This situation reflects in part a sense of complacency 
among  the  Europeans  and  a  lack  of  political  will,  especially  in  current 
circumstances, to make some difficult policy choices. The complacency of 
the Europeans arises from their view that they are victims in the current 
economic and financial crisis. They see little wrong in the economic policies 
that they have followed. In particular, they argue that they have developed 
a competitive advantage in the export of certain types of goods, and 
exploiting this advantage was a major impetus to growth in the period 
before the current crisis. They see no reason to change this basic model 
for growth.
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actions to improve their medium-term economic performance, especially 
because such actions are seen as entailing significant near-term costs. 
No serious consideration is being given to diversifying their economies 
by removing barriers that constrain Europe’s growth. There is no appetite 
for dealing with the significant rigidities that exist in labor and product 
markets. Instead, the Europeans are content to wait for world growth to 
resume. They tend to believe that the world economy will essentially go 
back relatively quickly to levels of activity and demand similar to those 
that prevailed before the current crisis. 
However, things will not be the same. In addition to slow demand growth 
in the United States, growth in demand within Europe will be significantly 
slower than previously. Growth in Eastern Europe will be less robust as these 
countries cope with the fallout from the current crisis. These countries will 
have to deal with an overhang of foreign currency denominated debt, and 
they will encounter difficulties in rolling over existing loans and a drying 
up of new credit flows, especially as Western European lenders scale back 
their operations. Moreover, these countries have generally experienced 
a significant loss in competitiveness. The only way for them to restore 
competitiveness, if they seek to maintain fixed exchange rates or limit 
exchange rate movements relative to the euro, is through slower growth 
in their domestic demand. 
But the biggest problem for Europe is within the euro area. The area’s 
southern countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) have become non-
competitive both within the euro area and externally. Since they are now 
members  of  the  euro,  they  cannot  rely—as  they  have  in  the  past—on 
changes in their nominal exchange rates to produce a real depreciation in 
order to restore their competitiveness. They have only two choices. They 
can raise competitiveness by improving the efficiency of their economies 
through structural reforms. Or slow economic growth in these countries to 
allow an improvement in competitiveness through lower inflation than in 
the rest of the euro area. The latter is the likely way that competitiveness 
will be improved because of a lack of political will to implement needed 
reforms in these countries’ product and labor markets. As a result, the 
countries of Southern Europe are in for a long and economically painful 
adjustment.  This  adjustment  is  likely  to  severely  test  the  future  of 
monetary union and the euro.
Slow  growth  in  Southern  and  Eastern  Europe  will  significantly  impair 
growth in the Northern European countries. This will be especially true for 
Germany, which is very heavily dependent on exports to other European 
countries, as well as the rest of the world. Stagnation in Europe, coupled 
with slow U.S. growth, will directly depress growth in the rest of the world. 
But it may also have important indirect adverse effects on world growth. 
With slow growth throughout Europe and increased difficulties and stress 
in Southern Europe, protectionist pressures are likely to rise. The recent 
EU decision to impose anti-dumping duties on steel pipe imports from 
China  on  the  basis  of  prospective  (not  actual)  injury  to  the  domestic 
industry from such imports may be a harbinger of further recourse to 
protection as recovery in Europe proceeds much more slowly than the 
Europeans currently expect.
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country  appears  to  be  on  the  verge  of  slipping  into  its  second  major 
deflation in the last two decades, and the country will remain dependent 
on exports for economic recovery and growth. At this juncture, the best 
the authorities are able to do is to try to limit the slide in the economy 
through  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  actions.  Scope  for  fiscal  action  is 
limited because of the massive size of the government’s debt and the 
need to ensure adequate resources are available over the medium term to 
meet obligations to Japan’s rapidly aging population. Consumption growth 
is likely to remain constrained as household savings remain high reflecting 
uncertainties about employment prospects and the government’s ability 
to  meet  its  pension  and  health  care  obligations  without  tax  increases 
or spending cuts. Above all, Japan is mired in political instability that 
prevents it from taking meaningful steps to deal with structural problems 
in the economy, 
The  only  hope  for  lifting  Japan’s  potential  growth  rate  and  domestic 
demand  over  the  medium  term  lies  in  implementing  badly  needed 
structural reforms—especially increasing the flexibility of product markets 
and improving access to the labor market. Enacting such measures would 
entail taking on entrenched vested interests and changing cultural norms. 
The fact that they will not significantly alter near-term economic prospects 
makes them politically very unattractive and unlikely to be implemented in 
the current political environment. 
Myriad rules, regulations, and restrictions severely limit the scope for new 
entrants, innovation, and increased efficiency in many markets in Japan, 
particularly in distribution and the services sector. Moreover, the rapid 
aging of Japan’s population adds to the urgency of opening up the labor 
market to avoid a further slowdown in Japan’s already anaemic rate of 
growth. Increased immigration may play a part in providing needed labor 
resources, but a far more important role could be played by bringing back 
into the labor force an already well trained, disenfranchised group—namely 
Japanese women. The labor force participation rate of women in Japan is 
depressed by cultural factors, but more importantly it is constrained by 
the lack of adequate day care for children and elder care. 
What About Asian Economies?
Asia is considered to be the bright spot in the world economy at the 
moment. On the whole, the emerging market economies of the region 
have been judged to have weathered the economic and financial crisis 
better than the advanced countries and better than expected late in 2008 
and early 2009.12 Growth in many of these countries is seen as picking 
up  after  sharp  slumps.  This  has  prompted  some  renewed  discussion 
about decoupling of Asian economies from advanced country growth and 
suggestions that major countries in the region—particularly China—could 
be engines of growth for the world economy. Unfortunately, this prospect 
12   In large part, this better-than-expected performance reflects the overly pessimistic 
forecasts for these countries made in late 2008. China is a notable example. Most analysts 
forecasting China’s growth for 2009 in late 2008 raced to mark down their forecast 
without giving adequate consideration to the effects of China’s fiscal stimulus and credit 
loosening measures. As these same analysts now mark up their growth forecasts, there 
is a tendency to attribute the revisions to the Asian economies being more resilient to the 
crisis than to attribute them to forecast errors owing to underestimates of the effects of 
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is highly unlikely.13 The perceived strength in economic activity in Asia 
at present looks to be associated with a temporary recovery in growth 
largely owing to a slowing of the rate of inventory decumulation or shifts 
to  small  inventory  accumulation  and  to  continued  effects  of  fiscal  and 
monetary  stimulus  measures.    While  Asia  may  be  looking  better  than 
expected in 2009, economic prospects for the region in 2010 and beyond, 
in the absence of major changes in economic policies and structures, 
will remain heavily dependent on recovery and growth in the advanced 
countries. 
China, in particular, appears to be weathering the crisis well, thanks to 
quick government policy actions to stimulate the economy. The authorities 
will achieve their 8 percent target for GDP growth in 2009. But relatively 
strong  growth  in  China  is  not  providing  much  stimulus  for  the  rest  of 
the world, as China’s trade and current account surpluses remain large. 
Moreover,  without  a  significant  revival  in  external  demand,  it  will  be 
difficult for China to achieve its 8 percent GDP growth objective in 2010 and 
succeeding years unless the government continues to supply substantial 
stimulus to the economy to prop up growth, especially given the emphasis 
that continues to be placed on boosting investment.
China’s economic development has been driven since the mid-1980s by 
investment growth. In the early years of economic reform in China (which 
began in 1978), consumption rose strongly and was the major factor in 
China’s growth. As economic reforms in the urban areas began in earnest 
in the mid-1980s, there was a distinct shift in China’s growth back toward 
the kind of investment-driven model that dominated China’s development 
in the pre-reform era. This shift accelerated after the Tiananmen Square 
protests in 1989. A basic flaw in this development model became evident 
in  the  early  1990s  as  rapid  investment  growth  led  to  increases  in  the 
production  of  goods  that  outstripped  domestic  demand.  Mountains  of 
“unsellable” goods built up as the government sought to maintain relatively 
rapid growth. 
To  resolve  the  problem,  the  Chinese  authorities  decided  to  find  new 
external sources of demand for Chinese goods. They chose to stick to 
the investment-driven growth model and rely on exports and substitution 
of domestic production for imported goods to fully utilize the excess in 
productive  capacity  over  domestic  consumption  that  continued  rapid 
investment would generate. Key reforms launched in the period 1994-95 
opened up China’s economy and served to shift production toward exports 
and import substitution. Also, set in place were key price distortions—
especially a low cost of capital and an undervalued exchange rate—that 
supported this investment-driven/export-led growth model.
Policies that have maintained a low cost of capital in China have contributed 
to stunting the growth of consumption. Households over most of the past 
two decades have experienced a significant decline in personal income 
relative to GDP owing largely to a decline in investment income. Despite 
large savings, households’ investment income has fallen relative to GDP 
because the major investment vehicle for these savings are bank deposits 
13   This is a view shared by some leaders in the region. At the July 2009 U.S. and China 
Strategic  and  Economic  Dialogue,  China’s  central  bank  Governor,  Zhou  Xiaochuan, 
suggested that a sustainable recovery in China’s growth would not occur until the U.S. 
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and a low ceiling has been set by the government for the interest rates 
paid on these deposits. In turn, a low deposit rate permits the banks to 
lend at relatively low rates. The cost of capital has also been held down 
by the virtual lack of dividend payments to the government by the state-
owned enterprises.14 Consequently, retained earnings of these firms have 
been a large pool of low cost financing for investment. 
The low cost of capital coupled with the poor intermediation of savings 
by the major state-owned commercial banks has resulted in substantial 
resources being directed toward the large state-owned enterprises, which 
tend to be in capital-intensive industries. As a result, production in China 
has become very capital intensive, creating the rather ironic situation that 
output growth does not generate much employment growth in a country 
that has such a large pool of underemployed workers. The official target 
for growth is set at 8 percent because that level of growth is viewed as 
being required to produce the 1-2 percent of employment growth needed 
per year to absorb new entrants to the work force and reduce somewhat 
the substantial underemployment of labor in the rural areas.15
At the same time, by maintaining an undervalued exchange rate China 
has imposed growing costs on its economy. In particular, it has created 
a  serious  overallocation  of  resources  in  export  and  import-substituting 
industries. This situation will have to be sorted out at some point, and 
the  problem  and  the  costs  of  sorting  it  out  will  only  grow  the  longer 
adjustment  is  delayed.  Moreover,  when  the  inevitable  appreciation  in 
China’s currency happens, the country will experience a substantial loss 
on the massive foreign exchange reserves it has accumulated while trying 
to  keep  its  currency  undervalued—a  loss  that  the  Chinese  authorities 
are already very concerned about. Nevertheless, China’s authorities are 
reluctant to allow the exchange rate to appreciate out of fear of the short-
term impact appreciation could have on growth. As a consequence, costs 
of adjustment for the real economy increase and the country continues 
to pile up large amounts of reserves, making the capital loss that will 
eventually occur greater and greater. 
Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate also stunts the development of 
China’s financial sector. Efforts to get its banking system to operate on a 
sound commercial basis are undermined by the government’s continued 
interference  in  the  banks’  business  decisions  through  heavy  reliance 
on window guidance to control credit expansion and establish lending 
priorities. The government has been forced to rely on such direct measures 
to influence bank lending out of concern that use of conventional indirect 
means of monetary control, which would rely on increases in domestic 
interest rates, could induce increasing inflows of foreign money as capital 
controls have become more porous. 
China’s growth model up to now certainly has delivered impressive results, 
making China the third largest economy in the world and closing in fast to 
being the number one trading nation. However, because of the country’s 
success and its increased importance in the world economy, time appears to 
14  Beginning in 2008, the central government’s state-owned enterprises have been required 
on a trial basis to make modest dividend payments to the budget.
15  In contrast, advanced countries generate 1-2 percent of employment growth per year 
from  2-3  percent  of  GDP  growth.  See  Jahangir  Aziz  and  Steven  Dunaway,  “China’s 
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have run out on China’s continued use of this investment-driven/export-led 
growth model. This is particularly true given prospects for slower demand 
in the advanced economies. Continued rapid investment in China will add 
to productive capacity and require continued strong export growth to take 
up the excess in productive capacity over what is demanded domestically. 
But to maintain relatively rapid export growth in a slowly growing world 
economy,  China’s  producers  will  have  to  lower  their  export  prices  and 
cut  their  margins  substantially  to  overcome  competitive  pressures  so 
that they will be able to take the ever-increasing share of world trade 
required for China to be able to meet an 8 percent target for its growth.16 
However,  with  declining  margins,  Chinese  firms  would  be  expected  to 
cut investment over time if they are operating on a commercial basis. 
In these circumstances, Chinese banks too, if they are operating on a 
commercial basis, should be increasingly reluctant to lend. Consequently, 
rapid growth and development in China cannot be sustained unless there 
is strong continued fiscal support or increased government interference in 
business decisions. The situation facing China could be even worse if the 
country’s attempts to maintain export growth were to invite increasing 
retaliation from partner countries.
Unfortunately, the past success of its growth model makes the Chinese 
authorities very reluctant to do more than make gradual changes to it. 
Policies adopted by the authorities to deal with the current economic and 
financial crisis generally continue to focus on boosting investment and 
stabilizing export growth. 
In addition, the Chinese authorities are drawing the wrong lessons from 
the  current  crisis,  leading  the  government  to  decide  to  play  an  even 
bigger  role  in  the  economy.  Advanced  countries  interventions  in  their 
financial systems are being taken as proof that China’s system, which 
remains dominated by the government, is superior. The stability of China’s 
banking  system  during  the  current  financial  crisis  is  only  an  indication 
of its detachment from world markets; it is not an indication of inherent 
strength or soundness. In reality, China’s banking system is staggering 
forward toward its next crisis and recapitalization by the government. The 
system has been recapitalized twice in the last 10 years, and only limited 
progress has been achieved in reforming it and getting it to operate like 
an efficient, commercially based system. The government’s push to have 
the banks expand lending as part of its economic stimulus plan probably 
brings  forward  the  date  when  another  recapitalization  will  be  needed. 
Substantial new non-performing loans are expected to be created by the 
government-sanctioned surge in lending that has taken place. Advanced 
country interventions in the automobile industry are also seen as providing 
justification for China’s efforts to restructure 14 of its major industries. As 
part of these restructurings, China’s large state-owned enterprises are 
envisaged as playing a dominant role in these industries. This is likely to 
be a major step backward for the economy.
The Chinese authorities recognize the need for change, but they think 
that there is plenty of time to enact it. They have publicly stated that the 
economy needs to be rebalanced away from its heavy dependence on 
16  Kai  Guo  and  Papa  N’Diaye,  “Is  China’s  Export-Oriented  Growth  Sustainable?”,  IMF 
Working Paper, No. 09/169, August 2009 provides a quantitative scenario illustrating this 
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investment and exports toward consumption.17 To do so requires removing 
price distortions and other policy changes to eliminate inefficiencies and 
incentives favoring investment over consumption. Serious distortions exist 
in the pricing of energy, other utilities, land, and pollution abatement; but, 
as noted above, the major price distortions are the low cost of capital 
and  the  undervalued  exchange  rate.  Capital  costs  need  to  be  raised 
significantly, and that cannot be done without permitting more flexibility 
and a more rapid rate of appreciation of the exchange rate. 
The ceiling imposed on interest rates paid on savings deposits is a major 
factor behind the low cost of capital, keeping the bank lending rate low and 
holding down the opportunity cost for enterprises’ use of their retained 
earning for investment. This ceiling needs to be lifted. In turn, a higher cost 
of capital along with a stronger currency will help curb overinvestment in 
export and import-substituting industries. Real household incomes would 
also be boosted by increases in both bank deposit rates and the exchange 
rate. Consumption would rise as a consequence.
Financial market reform is also needed to improve the intermediation of 
savings in China. Lifting the cap on deposit rates would not only help 
push  up  the  cost  of  capital,  it  would  also  increase  competition  in  the 
banking sector and provide incentives for banks to expand credit to new 
customers. Bond and equity markets need to be more fully developed 
to provide alternative sources of financing for firms and a much broader 
array  of  assets  for  households  to  invest  in.  Small-  and  medium-sized 
firms have had to rely largely on retained earnings or the assets of their 
owners to finance investment. Consumers also have had limited access to 
credit. Better credit access and higher yielding assets to invest in would 
reduce household saving and raise household incomes over time, boosting 
consumption.
The government also has an important direct role to play in rebalancing the 
economy. It has to continue improving critical social services, especially 
education,  health  care,  and  pensions.  Reducing  the  uncertainties 
surrounding  the  provision  of  these  services  will  substantially  diminish 
households’ strong precautionary savings motive and give households the 
confidence needed to raise consumption.
17   Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in his address to the National People’s Congress in March 
2007 said that “the biggest problem in China’s economy is that growth is unstable, 
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Prospects for New Zealand
In this less favorable external environment, a small, open economy like 
New  Zealand  faces  uncertain  prospects.  Two  specific  questions  bear 
consideration: what will become of New Zealand’s large current account 
deficit and what can New Zealand do to cope with slow and potentially 
volatile growth in the rest of the world?
The key to assessing implications of the current account deficit for New 
Zealand’s future is to understand the sources of the deficit and how it is 
being financed (Figure 8). New Zealand’s current account deficit does not 
really look to be part of the problem of global as defined in this paper. 
Structural  problems  in  New  Zealand’s  economy  do  not  appear  to  be  a 
factor contributing to the deficit. Looking at macroeconomic level data, 
the deficit also does not appear to arise from a basic imbalance between 
savings and investment. However, problems with the macroeconomic data 
make it difficult to draw firm conclusions. 
Investment rose over the period 2000-2008, accounting for a significant 
part of the increase in the current account deficit. Roughly half of the 
rise in investment was in housing. To a significant extent, the increase in 
residential investment served to meet the needs of a growing population 
owing to rising immigration. It also may have reflected some business 
investment  since  non-corporate  farming  is  included  in  the  household 
sector, and there were significant increases in productive capacity in this 
sector with the rise in commodity prices. 
Figure 8. New Zealand: Current Account Deficit
Percent of GDP
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Concerns have been expressed about the level of household savings and 
the large amount of debt households took on during the 2000s. Some 
distortions created by tax policy explain part of this behavior, but how 
important  they  were  in  influencing  households’  decisions  to  save  less 
than they should have or to take on more debt than they can reasonably 
be expected to service is not clear. With the limitations imposed by the 
weaknesses in macro data, it is important to expand research using micro 
data to better explain savings and investment behavior and to broaden 
understanding of the forces that drove the rise in the current account 
deficit.  Such  research  should  also  provide  valuable  insights  as  to  how 
government policies may have played a part.
Some indirect evidence as to whether a serious imbalance existed between 
savings and investment can be inferred from the behavior of New Zealand’s 
exchange rate. If domestic demand in New Zealand (particularly driven 
by low savings) had been a major factor behind the rise in the current 
account deficit, then it would have been expected that the exchange rate 
would depreciate. Instead, the exchange rate appreciated strongly over 
the period after 2006 when the current account deficit was rising sharply. 
This currency appreciation suggests that it was capital flowing into New 
Zealand that in effect pushed the current account into a larger deficit. In 
part, this capital inflow reflected increased movement of funds through 
the channel normally used to finance New Zealand. Historically, the bulk 
of  external  financing  for  New  Zealand  has  been  provided  through  the 
banking system. In recent years, New Zealand banks tended to borrow in 
U.S. dollars and then use currency swaps to offset the foreign exchange 
risk. From the banks’ perspective, they are essentially borrowing in New 
Zealand dollars, while their foreign lenders see themselves as having U.S. 
dollars loans.18 The rise in inflows through this channel during the 2000s 
reflected  New  Zealand  riding  the  wave  of  cheap  U.S.  dollar  financing 
produced  by  the  global  savings  glut.  The  relatively  short-term  nature 
of this financing, however, exposed New Zealand to significant liquidity 
problems when the financial crisis hit in the second half of 2008.
The rise in capital inflows also reflected increased demand for New Zealand 
dollar-denominated  assets.  In  a  world  where  investors  were  hunting 
for low risk assets with higher returns, New Zealand became a desired 
destination. The differential between U.S. and New Zealand interest rates 
widened significantly during the mid-2000s. This differential was perceived 
by investors as overstating the underlying risk of default of New Zealand 
dollar assets and, at least initially, the risk of an adverse movement (an 
depreciation) in New Zealand’s exchange rate. The result was substantial 
inflows through the issue of Uridashi- and euro-kiwi bonds.  
In recent months, the direct flow of financing into New Zealand dollar 
assets has diminished substantially, with net redemptions of Uridashi and 
euro-kiwi bonds rising. U.S. dollar funding, however, has risen somewhat as 
18   The swap portion of lending transactions also should provide the offshore lenders with 
additional assurances that they essentially have U.S. dollar assets and have not acquired 
foreign exchange risk indirectly. This and the creditworthiness of New Zealand banks 
(and their Australian parents) explain why the banks can operate in the interbank U.S. 
dollar market on relatively favorable terms. In sharp contrast, consider Austrian banks, 
for example, that lent in euros to Eastern European residents. These banks may have 
thought that they did not have foreign exchange risk, but they have found out that they 
have acquired such risk indirectly because of potential difficulties the borrowers may face 
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world financial markets have returned to more normal conditions and New 
Zealand banks have restored some of the funding that they previously lost. 
The sharp exchange rate depreciation in early 2009 largely reflected the 
disruptions in world markets. With restoration of access to dollar funding 
in recent months, the value of the New Zealand dollar has risen back 
toward its previous level. However, with demand in New Zealand subdued 
and likely to remain that way for some time, the exchange rate would be 
expected to decline in the period ahead, slowly growing domestic loan 
demand would reduce the need for New Zealand banks to raise offshore 
funding. 
Financing through the U.S. dollar market will remain available for New 
Zealand, but there could be periods of volatility depending largely on how 
the United States deals with its fiscal position over the medium term, and 
the willingness of investors to continue to park large amounts of funds in 
U.S dollar assets. It appears likely at least in the period immediately ahead 
as China clings to heavily managing its exchange rate that demand for U.S. 
dollar assets will remain strong. At the same time, the push that came 
from capital inflows and raised New Zealand’s current account deficit will 
diminish, and the deficit can be expected to fall back to significantly lower 
levels, especially as domestic demand grows more slowly. New Zealand 
in effect has been a small bucket dipping into the large lake of demand 
for U.S. dollar assets, and it should be able to relatively easily finance 
its reduced current account deficit going forward. But it cannot take its 
relatively  small  size  for  granted  and  simply  assume  that  financing  will 
always be there. Financing will be available only as long as New Zealand 
continues to be very well managed economically.
In the end, it is obvious that there is little that New Zealand can do to 
escape the effects of the slow recovery in the world economy that is in 
prospect. It can also do little to change this outcome. With a slow world 
economic recovery, commodity prices can be expected to be relatively 
stagnant for some time, especially prices for the type of “soft” commodities 
that  New  Zealand  produces.  There  is  also  a  significant  risk  that  New 
Zealand’s commodity exports will face increasing protectionist pressures 
and subsidized competition from other countries in world markets.19 There 
is some hope that New Zealand’s markets in developing countries in Asia 
will provide support for its exports. However, given the continued heavy 
reliance of these countries on the rest of the world—particularly the United 
States—to propel them, growth in these countries is not expected to be 
substantially greater than in the advanced economies.
To  survive  and  prosper  the  best  it  can  in  such  a  hostile  environment, 
New Zealand’s economy will have to retain its considerable flexibility and 
adaptability. This is the only way a small, open economy will be able to 
cope with the stiff challenges that it is likely to face. 
19   For example, the fall in dairy prices is already prompting pressures for greater subsidies 
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Concluding Remarks
This  paper  paints  a  rather  gloomy  picture  of  the  prospects  for  world 
economic  recovery  and  growth.  Given  present  tendencies  in  major 
economies, it is extremely difficult to come to another view. 
The United States among the major economies is the only one that is 
adjusting its savings and investment imbalances. Household savings have 
risen, and will rise further in the period ahead. Within the next two years, 
the U.S. Administration also will have to follow through on its commitment 
to consolidate the fiscal deficit, contributing to a significant rise in U.S. 
national savings. 
At the same time, the slack in world demand left by slower U.S. growth is 
not likely to be picked up by any of the other major world economies. All 
of them have been and appear likely to continue to be heavily dependent 
on exports to drive growth. Europe is complacent and appears content to 
simply wait for growth in the rest of the world to lift it out of recession. 
However, in addition to the prospect of slow U.S. growth, Europe faces 
significant internal difficulties. Problems in Eastern Europe and increasing 
difficulties in Southern Europe will hold down demand growth within the 
region. In Japan, economic uncertainty and political instability are likely to 
continue to suppress domestic demand. In the rest of East Asia, countries 
will also continue to depend heavily on exports to generate growth. China, 
in particular, looks likely to continue to lean heavily on exports to sustain 
relatively rapid economic growth.
Hence, prospects for world growth are gloomy, but they do not have to 
be. Steps that each major economy needs to take to boost their long-term 
growth prospects (and prospects for the world economy) are well known 
and have been discussed at length for many years. What is needed is 
recognition of the situation by the political authorities in these economies 
and the will to act and do what is after all in the best interests of each 
and every one of them. How to spark the necessary actions unfortunately 
looks likely to remain the major question, as it has been for the past 
several years. 
In the meantime all a small, open economy like New Zealand can do to 
survive is to continue to follow policies in its best interest — stay flexible 
and adaptable in order to be able to deal with the challenges that it will 
face. At present, New Zealand appears relatively well positioned to handle 
the challenges that it faces. But there is no room for complacency, and in 
particular, much could be gained by further research and scrutiny on how 
economic policies are affecting savings and investment behavior.8 Halswell St, Thorndon | PO Box 3479, Wellington 
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